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Eurobarometer polls also show that support for the EU has in fact decreased almost everywhere. 
Distrust in the EU increased from 32% in 2007 to 60% in 2012. Last year, opposition to the Economic 
and Monetary Union and the euro grew to 40%; 45% of the population felt pessimistic about the future 
of the EU and 29% had a poor view of the EU. This trend was particularly marked in southern member 
states, but not exclusively. Euroscepticism has also soared in the six largest member states, which elect 
half of the MEPs. Seventy-two per cent of Spaniards say that they do not trust the EU, compared to 
24% six years ago. In the UK, the number is 69%, 58% in Germany, 56% in France, 53% in Italy, and 
42% in Poland (compared to 18% in 2007). According to a recent Harris poll, 73% of Spaniards and 
56% of Italians believe that Germany was wrong to impose tough austerity measures on them at a time 
when economic growth was weak. Concerns about the increasing influence of Germany in the EU 
were voiced not only in Spain and Italy, but also in France and the UK. 
The outlook for 2014 European Parliament elections 
The participation rate in EP elections has dropped steadily since the first call for a direct vote in 1979, 
with the most recent elections in 2009 showing a historically low turnout low of 43%. Turnout in the 
elections in Croatia last April was below 21%. Eurobarometer surveys reveal that most European 
citizens (more than 50%) do not think that their vote is going to change anything; they think that the 
EP does not deal with problems that really concern them, they lack information about the elections and 
the EP and are not interested in EU affairs. For most potential voters, the EP elections lack the clear 
purpose of national elections. These elections do not constitute an instrument to sanction the 
incumbent government (largely the Commission and the Council). EP elections do not submit a 
specific legislative programme for approval, since the right of initiative lies mostly with the European 
Commission (and exceptionally with the Council). Furthermore, the political differences across 
European political parties are not easily understandable, which makes these elections even less 
attractive for voters. European parties are more of a confederation of national delegations with 
different ideologies, idiosyncrasies and interests, rather than a typical national party with a clearly 
defined political programme and strong internal discipline to implement this programme. It is national 
parties that select the candidates as MEPs and carry out the campaigns. Moreover, the main political 
groups in the EP tend to vote together on many legislative files to reinforce the EP’s position in 
negotiations with the Council and the Commission. All this, together with the difficulties that many 
citizens encounter in following EU affairs (not helped by the complexity of EU decision-making, 
multifarious policies and poor media coverage), tends to relegate the elections to the European 
Parliament to second-order elections largely focused on domestic rather than European issues.  
To counter this trend, a recent EP initiative urged the main European political alliances to name their 
candidates for the post of European Commission president well in advance so that they could run an 
EU-wide campaign focused on EU issues, in the assumption that this would encourage citizens to go 
and vote. It also calls upon national parties to make clear which European party they belong to and the 
candidate they will support. The euro crisis has also made citizens all over Europe (both in the 
‘rescued’ and the ‘rescuer’ member states) much more aware of the consequences of EU decisions for 
their daily lives. The impact of ‘Brussels’ on national fiscal and economic policies is being felt 
directly by EU citizens, and not in a positive way. As a result, the debate about the EU has moved 
away from bureaucrats’ offices onto the street, and the divisions over EU affairs across national and 
European parties are becoming more marked.  
However, it might be eurosceptic rather than pro-European parties that reap the benefits of these 
developments in the end. An increase in the number of votes for radical eurosceptic parties would 
quickly be mirrored in their representation in the EP, given the electoral systems operating in member 
states. Most of them use proportional methods in the distribution of seats and a single electoral district, 
which increases the proportionality of the system. Only 11 member states have a legal threshold, 
which is always below 5%. It is therefore likely that these parties will obtain parliamentary 
representation should they manage to sweep up the protest vote against the EU and the ruling parties ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE TROUBLE WITH VOX POPULI | 3 
that backed its decisions. They might even try to form a big anti-European coalition. This could pose 
an unprecedented risk for the functioning and identity of the EP. Since 1989, the number of EP parties 
has increased steadily, due to EU enlargements and the 2002 reform of the electoral law, which 
established a more proportional system. However, the number of political groups has decreased. In the 
last two legislatures the two main groups (conservatives and socialists) held more than 60% of the 
seats. A wide representation of parties not belonging to the main pro-European parliamentary groups 
would make the majority of the component members required in many votes very difficult to reach. 
This would stall decision-making in the Chamber, and therefore in the EU, including the election of 
the president of the Commission itself. It could also hamper the EP’s firm stand on promoting the 
principles of democracy, human rights and EU integration. 
 Conclusions 
The nomination of candidates for the position of president of the European Commission by European 
political parties might not turn out to be such a brilliant idea after all. Some nominees currently being 
discussed are unknown in many countries and would therefore not inspire citizens to go out and vote. 
Others could simply underline dissatisfaction and boost the EU protest vote in some member states.   
Moreover, the proposal of the Commission president by the EP might lead to a further politicisation of 
this EU institution, at a time when a strong and independent Commission is needed more than ever. 
Alternatively, what is needed is a campaign by European and national political parties and by EU 
institutions to extol the virtues of the European Union and expose the costs of less or no Europe. The 
main European parties should also reflect on the reasons behind this growing disenchantment with the 
EU and come up with actual political manifestos for the elections that respond to real concerns. They 
should explain their positions in the relevant legislative dossiers currently in the pipeline (e.g. banking 
union) and state which others they intend to push forward (for instance in the area of employment, or 
immigration). In parallel, the EU should adopt a sound strategy to create jobs and a better 
communication strategy to justify its (economic) decisions. Citizens need to believe that both their 
votes and the European Union matter, and the EU undoubtedly has to show that citizens also matter.  